Cybercriminaliteit is anno 2023 een urgent maatschappelijk probleem. De wereldwijde financiële schade werd met $6 triljoen in 2020 gelijk of groter geschat dan de financiële schade als gevolg van de georganiseerde handel in drugs (Ahamad, 2020). Het is niet aannemelijk dat cybercriminaliteit in de tussenliggende jaren in omvang en impact is afgenomen, integendeel. Cybercriminaliteit staat al enige jaren steevast in de top vijf van belangrijkste wereldwijde problemen (World Economic Forum, 2019). Ook in Nederland grijpt slachtofferschap van cybercriminaliteit steeds verder om zich heen. In het jaar 2021 waren er volgens het CBS bijna 2,5 miljoen Nederlandse slachtoffers (CBS, 2022) van cybercriminaliteit en al geruime tijd worden meer Nederlanders slachtoffer van hacking dan van fietsendiefstal (Leukfeldt, 2018).

In 2021, the Recast Dual-Use Regulation entered into force. The regulation includes a heavily debated new provision on the export control of so-called cybersurveillance items. This provision departs from the traditional logic of export control rules in multiple ways. Most importantly, it positions human rights considerations as an important factor in the export control of a flexible range of technologies. This article explores the operation, implications and challenges of this new human rights-orientated approach to export control of digital surveillance technologies. Taking the definition of cybersurveillance items as a starting point of the analysis, the article draws on surveillance-related case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, to define the potential scope of application of the open-ended cybersurveillance concept of the Regulation. By exploring how this concept maps to technologies often connected with human rights infringements, such as facial recognition, location tracking and open-source intelligence, the article highlights the challenges of applying this new approach and underscores the need for its further development in practice.

Research on cyber-co-offending tends to focus on either the organizational structure of organized cybercrime or social learning processes among individuals. This paper provides a new perspective on co-offending by examining the extent to which individuals co-offend for different types of cybercrime compared to traditional crime. Additionally, differences in the type of co-offender (friends, family, or others) and relationships between IT- knowledge and cyber-co-offending are examined. This paper is based on individual self-report survey data from a judicial sample of Dutch adult cyber-dependent offenders and traditional offenders. It includes information on 466 different crimes (51.50% cybercrime) self-reported by 164 individuals. Results indicate that cybercrime and traditional crime show similar patterns of co-offending. The majority of offenders prefer to commit their crimes alone, but some types of crime are more often committed with co-offenders than other types of crime. For cybercrime results suggest that limitations in an offender’s IT-knowledge may be a reason to seek co-offenders with strong IT-skills.