An efficient and impartial European public prosecution service cannot exist without effective external independence of the EU institutions and the Member States. Likewise, the internal autonomy of its members is of utmost importance. The idea of independence has been underscored from the project’s inception in the late 1990s to Regulation 2017/2019 (hereinafter, the Regulation), which ultimately established the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). In fact, independence is one of the EPPO’s main, if not its most important feature.

The effectiveness of the EPPO demands a functional interpretation of Art. 22(3) of the EPPO Regulation . Yet, the precise contour of this functional interpretation is far from being shaped, and such a task must be accomplished by practitioners, academics, and jurisprudence in the years to come.

One of the challenges for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which the Member States identified during the negotiations on the EPPO Regulation, was the speed of criminal proceedings. How can we make sure that investigations will not take even longer with the addition of this new actor in the chain of criminal justice? Considering that most legal decisions during the investigation of a PIF crime will now be made in Luxembourg, will this make criminal proceedings even more bureaucratic?

The questionable decision to exclude the competence of the EPPO for criminal offences in respect of national direct taxes could adversely affect its capacity to fight VAT fraud.

This article critically examines the extent to which the European Public Prosecutor’s Office can be claimed to constitute a prime example of supranational criminal law. The article observes that among policymakers and commentators, the Office appears to be a hallmark of the transformation of EU criminal law from an intergovernmental paradigm to a strong federal and supranational polity.

The advent of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has been broadly welcomed throughout the European legal community, including by legal entities operating in the single market and their advisors. Even so, considerable uncertainties remain for these economic actors on how the new enforcement regime will affect them. These uncertainties stem from the fact that the twenty-two jurisdictions in which the EPPO will operate have in some cases radically different approaches to issues such as the nature of and conditions for corporate criminal liability as well as the substantive and procedural framework governing corporate criminal investigations.