Het Openbaar Ministerie verdenkt een 44–jarige politieagent, werkzaam bij de politie-eenheid Midden-Nederland, van het lekken van vertrouwelijke politie-informatie. De verdenking betreft schending van de geheimhoudingsplicht, corruptie en computervredebreuk.

Incoming governments sometimes abuse their power to manipulate the allocation of government contracts so as to buy loyalty from cronies. While scandals suggest such practices are relatively widespread, the extent of such partisan favoritism is difficult to measure and the conditions under which it flourishes under-theorized. Drawing on theory regarding the role of institutions as constraints on corruption, we identify three spheres of political influence over government contracting and show how elites can manipulate two of those spheres to increase their opportunities to influence the procurement process and minimize external accountability, facilitating the corrupt allocation of contracts to partisan allies.